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ABSTRACT 
NONLINEARITY IN THE IMPACT OF INFLATION TARGETING ON 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
By 
 
Maleka Chirwa Thula 
 
 
Motivated by the controversy surrounding the effects of inflation targeting on economic 
performance, this paper assesses the impact of inflation targeting on unemployment and further 
explores whether the level of unemployment and financial development matter in determining the 
impact of inflation targeting on unemployment. To approach this issue, we utilise cross sectional 
data covering the period of 1990 to 2010 from 68 inflation targeting and non-targeting countries.  
The results show that inflation targeting has nonlinear effects on unemployment. On one 
hand, inflation targeting reduces unemployment, particularly for countries with higher 
unemployment rates. On the other hand, the beneficial effect of inflation targeting on 
unemployment is moderated by financial deepening.  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
 
Inflation targeting has become popular and dominant monetary policy framework being 
utilised in over 27 developed as well as developing countries. Generally, economists and central 
bankers agree that necessary requisites are important for adoption and successful implementation 
of inflation targeting framework. Bernanke, et al. (1999), Mishkin (2004), Aliyu and Englama 
(2009) put forward some key preconditions for determination and successful implementation of 
inflation targeting which include: the public pronouncement of medium-term inflation target; 
central bank primary objective being price stability; high degree of transparency in the conduct of 
monetary policy; and accountability of central bank in achieving the primary objective price 
stability. It is widely agreed that the primary goal of monetary policy is to achieve price stability 
(Batini, Laxton and Yates, 2003; Pianalto, 2005). Thus, inflation targeting is seen as a useful 
monetary policy framework that fulfils the goal of price stability. Unlike other targeting regimes 
such as money and exchange rate targeting that aim at achieving low and stable inflation by 
targeting intermediate variables, such as the growth rate of money aggregates or the level of the 
exchange rate of an “anchor” currency, inflation targeting involves targeting inflation directly 
(Batini and Laxton, 2007). The two major features of inflation targeting include: public 
announcement and commitment to a specific or a range of numerical inflation target and the 
second one is forecasting inflation over some horizon which becomes the de facto intermediate 
target of policy. 
Despite the popularity of inflation targeting among central bankers and economists, its 
role on economic performance has been debatable. The proponents of inflation targeting argue that 
adoption of inflation targeting leads to lower and stable inflation (Svensson, 1997; Bernanke, 
Launach, Mishkin and Posen, 1999 and Mishkin, 1999), hence anchoring inflation expectation 
more durably and permanently. On the other hand, inflation targeting is viewed as unimportant 
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factor for achieving price stability as well as boosting economic growth (Mishkin, 2000, 2004; 
Bernanke and Woodford, 2005 and Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2005).  
In spite of the unresolved controversy, inflation targeting since its adoption in New 
Zealand in 1990 has been widely regarded as a popular monetary policy framework in both 
advanced and emerging economies. In this paper, we shift the focus toward unemployment. We 
check whether inflation targeting has influence on unemployment. If inflation targeting leads to 
lower macroeconomic uncertainty and hence better business climate, it should increase the 
incentive to invest and hence more job creation. Unemployment would be lower in inflation 
targeting countries. However, studies on the impact of inflation targeting on unemployment have 
been few and also have yielded mixed results. For instance, Yeh and Huang (2014) and Balli and 
Louis (2013) which focus directly on the impact of inflation targeting on unemployment. Rather 
than focussing directly on unemployment, most scholarly research such as those of Carneiro et.al, 
2011, Belasen et.al, 2012, Bysetedt & Brito, 2009, Lin and Yeh, 2007, Mendonca and Souza 2011, 
and Reschreiter, 2010, have emphasised on the impact of inflation targeting on other 
macroeconomic aggregates. Unlike the previous studies, this paper tries to contribute to literature 
in three ways: firstly, by focussing directly on the impact of inflation targeting on unemployment 
it is expected therefore that this study will augment literature by further uncovering the 
unemployment-inflation targeting relationship. Secondly, by investigating on whether the impact 
of inflation targeting on unemployment depends on the level of unemployment itself constitutes a 
new contribution to literature since there have been few previous studies that have focused on this 
relationship. Finally, using interaction methodology to explore whether the impact of inflation 
targeting on unemployment; is a new contribution in literature. 
It is expected that countries that are more developed are likely to have less 
macroeconomic uncertainties, higher financial development, higher investment, more stable 
inflation and subsequently higher levels of job creation. Following this argument it is implied that 
less developed countries are more likely to have higher levels of unemployment, lower level of 
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financial development, more macroeconomic uncertainties and volatile inflation, just to mention 
but a few. Consequently, the level of unemployment and financial development could be 
important in determining the impact of inflation targeting on unemployment. Hence it is important 
to check whether the impact of inflation targeting depends on the level of unemployment and level 
of financial development. The main objective of the paper is therefore to investigate the 
nonlinearity in the impact of inflation targeting on unemployment. With this in mind, we have the 
following specific objectives which are set as hypothesis to be tested;  
a) Inflation targeting does not have any impact on unemployment;  
b) Impact of inflation targeting does not depend on level of unemployment;  
and c) Impact of inflation targeting on unemployment does not depend on the level of 
financial development. 
 In order to conduct this study, quantile regression approach as well as interaction 
methodology are employed1.  
By using cross-sectional data averaged over the period of 1990 to 2010 obtained from 68 
inflation targeting and non-inflation targeting countries, the findings reveal that inflation targeting 
has nonlinear negative effects on unemployment. Quantile results show that inflation targeting is 
negatively correlated with unemployment. In particular, adoption of inflation targeting in high 
unemployment countries reduces unemployment rate. However, interaction methodology results 
show that the beneficial effects of inflation targeting on unemployment is weakened by 
improvement in financial development. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature on 
inflation targeting. Chapter 3 describes the data and their sources as well as presents the 
methodology used. In Chapter 4, main results for quantile regression approach and interaction 
methodology are presented. Finally, chapter 5 provides conclusion and policy recommendations 
on the main findings of this study as well as suggest areas for future research. 
                                                          
1 Details on choice of methodology are discussed in Chapter 3, under methodology. 
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2.0 Literature Review 
 
 
Generally economists and central bankers agree that necessary requisites are important for 
adoption and successful implementation of inflation targeting framework. Bernanke, et al. (1999), 
Mishkin (2004), Aliyu and Englama (2009) put forward some key preconditions for determination 
and successful implementation of inflation targeting which include: the public pronouncement of 
medium-term inflation target; central bank primary objective being price stability; high degree of 
transparency in the conduct of monetary policy; and accountability of central bank in achieving 
the primary objective price stability. Arising from the foregoing requisites for inflation targeting is 
the need for the public to have access to information from central bank through enhanced 
communication channels as well as increased accountability of the monetary authorities regarding 
the inflation target. If the objective of price stability and specific inflation target are properly 
communicated to the public and all other preconditions are satisfied, then inflation targeting is 
more likely to be a success. 
However, since the adoption of inflation targeting in the 1990s as a monetary policy 
framework, its efficacy on the overall performance of the economy has ignited a heated debate. 
Theoretically, proponents of inflation targeting as an approach of monetary policy have argued 
that adoption of inflation targeting is associated with considerable benefits (Svensson, 1997, 
Bernanke, Launach, Mishkin and Posen, 1999 and Mishkin, 1999). Principal gains put forward by 
its proponents are lower and less variable inflation and interest rates, more stable growth and 
enhanced ability to respond to shocks without losing credibility (Salles and Gonçalves, 2006). The 
implication of this view is that attainment of low and stable inflation would result into economic 
growth, employment and poverty reduction, just to mention a few anticipated positive economic 
gains. On the other hand, inflation targeting is viewed as unimportant factor for achieving price 
stability as well as boosting economic growth (Romer, 2006, Mishkin, 2000, 2004; Bernanke and 
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Woodford, 2005 and Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2005). Romer (2006) calls this a “window 
dressing view” meaning that lower and stable inflation observed during the period of inflation 
targeting cannot be attributed to the effectiveness of inflation targeting but rather to the decision 
and efforts of authorities in the targeting countries to lower inflation. Besides, even in non-
inflation targeting countries inflation had been observed to be low during the same period. With 
respect to economic growth, it is argued that by obliging central banks to commit to low and stable 
inflation so restrictively reduces output and restrains growth. 
Empirically, there are several studies that look at the effectiveness of inflation targeting on 
various key economic variables. Salles et.al (2006), Batini and Laxton (2007), Lin and Ye (2007) 
find that adoption of inflation targeting is associated with lower inflation and more stable growth. 
Salles et.al (2006) show that 13 countries that adopted inflation targeting experienced lower and 
stable inflation compared  to non-targeters in a sample of 36 emerging countries. Similarly, Batini 
and Laxton (2007) establish that adoption of inflation targeting in developing countries lowers 
average inflation and real output growth volatility.  
Mendonca and Souza (2011) find that the adoption of inflation targeting is an ideal 
monetary regime for developing economies as it plays a crucial role in reducing inflation volatility 
as well as driving inflation down to internationally acceptable levels. However, their results 
further show that inflation targeting does not have significant impact on the developed economies. 
Johnson (2001) looks at the impact of inflation targeting on reducing expected inflation, the results 
show that inflation targeting is associated with the reduction in expected inflation after 
announcement of the inflation targets.  
Reschreiter (2011) investigates the impact of monetary policy regime shift to inflation 
targeting on the UK’s real interest rate. The findings of the study show that inflation targeting has 
the ability to reduce the volatility of real interest rate; the implication of these findings is that 
central banks can influence the stochastic properties of real interest rate through the choice of 
monetary regime (such as inflation targeting) in the long run. 
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Emirmahmutoglu, Aksoy, Kose (2012) look at the relationship between nominal interest 
rate and inflation expectation in Turkish economy during the period of inflation targeting. The 
results of this study indicate that monetary policy rates depend on inflationary expectations. The 
findings of the study also reveal that long-term interest rates are affected by monetary policy and 
that the actual inflation was close to targeted level, meaning that inflation targeting is crucial in 
bringing inflation to targeted level. 
In contrast, Bysetedt and Brito (2009) find no evidence to support the claim that inflation 
targeting leads to improved economic performance as measured by the behaviour of inflation and 
output growth in developing countries, rather results show unequivocal evidence of output 
reduction during the period of inflation targeting adoption. In addition, Ball and Sheridan (2005) 
find no any significant impact of inflation targeting on reducing inflation and inflation variability 
in developed countries. Lin and Ye (2009) also find no evidence to support that inflation targeting 
results in lower inflation and reduced inflation variability; rather their findings confirm the 
window dressing view of inflation targeting.  
Fouejieu (2013) investigates whether inflation targeting countries are more resilient and 
perform better than non-targeting countries when exposed to financial crisis. However, the results 
show that there is no significant difference in terms of inflation rate and growth rate between 
inflation targeters and non-targeters when exposed to financial crisis. Honig and Alpanda (2014) 
investigate the impact of central bank independence on performance of inflation targeting regimes, 
their findings show no significant impact of inflation targeting on reducing inflation in developed 
countries but show small benefits of inflation targeting in the developing countries. More baffling 
is their finding of large beneficial effects of inflation targeting in developing countries with lower 
level of central bank independence, this finding suggests that central bank independence is not the 
major requisite for countries to experience major decline in inflation.  
Choi, Kim, Osullivan (2011) investigate the effects of inflation targeting on relative 
variability of price variability and find no significant impact of decline in inflation after adoption 
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of inflation targeting on relative price variability. However, the results suggest that what is 
important for structural changes in relative price variability is not the adoption of inflation 
targeting per se but rather initial inflation regime prior to adoption of inflation targeting. 
Given that some studies have identified existence of relationship between inflation 
targeting and economic performance, now we review few studies that directly investigate the 
impact of inflation targeting on unemployment. The study by Yeh and Huang (2014) uses 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to identify the effect of inflation targeting on unemployment, 
and find no significant impact of inflation targeting on unemployment in a panel of 74 countries. 
However, when these countries are segregated to developing and developed countries, adoption of 
inflation targeting is found to be associated with higher (lower) unemployment in developed 
(developing) countries. The implication of these findings could be that adoption of inflation 
targeting is more likely to be effective in reducing unemployment in countries where 
unemployment is high compared to countries where unemployment is already low. Balli & Louis 
(2012) investigate whether targeting inflation rate too low is responsible for the differential 
unemployment rate observed between major Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries and the US. The findings show that targeting inflation rate too 
low does not have effects on unemployment in the short run. However, in the long-run the results 
reveal show high and persistent cost for OECD inflation targeting countries. And also those 
OECD inflation targeting countries are even worse off in terms of level of unemployment when 
compared with OECD non-targeting countries.  
Based on the reviewed literature, it is clear that there are differences in both theory and 
empirical findings on the role of inflation targeting on overall economic performance including 
unemployment; therefore further research on the subject matter is justified. 
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3.0 Data and Methodology 
 
 
3.1 Data 
Cross sectional data averaged over the period of 1990 to 2010 obtained from 68 inflation 
targeting and non-inflation targeting countries is used. The data is sourced from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (2014) and International Monetary Fund’s World Economic 
Outlook. Inflation targeting countries includes all countries in the EU that use euro currency and 
all countries that officially adopted inflation targeting framework. 
Identification strategy of targeting country follows Lin and Ye (2007), Ball and Sheridan 
(2003), where each country’s starting time of inflation targeting is defined as the first year in 
which a specific target or range of target was adopted. Furthermore, this paper attaches weights 
depending on the period each country adopted inflation targeting. For instance, a country that 
adopted inflation targeting in 1990 takes the value 1 while a country that adopted inflation 
targeting later than 1990 takes a value less than 1 but greater than 0. Weighting allows to capture 
the true impact of inflation targeting on unemployment. 
Another key variable included is liquid liabilities (M2), an indicator for financial 
development and also other variables to control for their effects on unemployment. Variables 
reported in Table 1 below are defined as follows: unemployment measured as a percentage of total 
labour force, it-share represents countries that adopted inflation targeting (0<it_share ≤ 1), 
otherwise equals 0, m2 is liquid liabilities, captures the level of financial development and is 
measured as money supply and quasi money as a percentage of GDP, rgdprate represents real 
GDP per capita growth rate, trade expressed as percentage of GDP is a measure of trade openness, 
government expenditure measured as percentage of GDP controls for policy effects on 
unemployment, pop_growth measured as a percentage of GDP accounts for impact of increase on 
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labour force on unemployment, urban_pop measured as a percentage of total urban population 
captures the impact of growth in urban population, inflation accounts for policy effects on 
economic growth. 
Table 1 and 2 show summary statistics for the data used in this paper. Table 1 shows 
descriptive statistics. Table 2 reports pair wise correlation for all variables used in 
contemporaneous regression model (panel A) and initial regression model (panel B). 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for panel data 
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std dev Min Max 
Panel A: Contemporaneous values 
unemp 60 8.204467 4.225559 1.486 23.135 
      
it_share 68 0.2661471 0.2936845 0 1 
      
inflation 67 173.832 494.3666 2.119 4031.543 
      
M2 68 77.94651 79.43588 18.88553 619.1556 
      
rgdprate 68 3.450235 1.803231 .249 10.16 
      
trade 68 82.14326 52.54461 22.453 363.961 
      
govt 68 17.66676 10.05139 4.896 86.582 
      
pop_growth 68 2.335162 10.17004 -1.157 84.534 
      
urbanpop 67 65.40152 20.63671 14.093 100 
      
Panel B: Initial regressors 
It_share 68 0.1531912 0.2853408 0 1 
      
Inflation 68 130.1837 378.9366 0.093 3039.444 
      
M2 68 64.74924 78.94548 11.481 618.945 
      
Rgdprate 68 1.956618 6.822473 -26.229 12.766 
      
Trade 68 70.87974 50.31134 14.991 344.83 
      
Govt 68 16.27615 6.829587 3.135 38.749 
      
pop_growth 68 1.282897 1.210651 -1.804 3.881 
      
urbanpop 68 62.27699 21.54331 11.56 100 
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Table 2 shows that most of the variables used are significantly correlated at 5 percent level 
and that there is no problem of perfect multicolinearity.  
Table 2: Correlation Matrix for cross-sectional data 
Panel A: Correlation for variables in Contemporaneous Model 
Variables unempr~e it_share M2 inflation rgdprate trade govt pop_grwth urbanpop 
unempr~e 1.0000         
          
it_share -0.0267 1.0000        
          
M2 -0.3237** 0.2217** 1.0000       
          
Inflation 0.4763** 0.0630 -0.0614 1.0000      
          
rgdprate -0.2015 -0.3087** -0.0389 -0.0058 1.0000     
          
trade -0.2579** -0.1448 0.4014** -0.1115 0.1526 1.0000    
          
govt -0.0442 0.2444** 0.1124 0.0103 -0.3821** -0.0142 1.0000   
          
pop_growth -0.1146 0.0897 0.0653 0.1631 -0.0980 -0.0539 0.8211** 1.0000  
          
urbanpop -0.1823 0.3651** 0.2659** -0.1409 -0.3952** 0.2106** 0.4811** -0.2039** 1.0000 
 Panel B: Correlation for variables initial values of regressors 
Variables unempr~e it_share M2 Inflation rgdp trade govt pop_grwth urbanpop 
unempr~e 1.0000         
          
it_share -0.1669 1.0000        
          
M2 -0.2983* 0.1791 1.0000       
          
inflation 0.1724 0.1521 0.1652 1.0000      
          
rgdp -0.1230 0.0049 -0.3197* -0.0511 1.0000     
          
Trade 0.2404* -0.0146 0.1013 -0.0530 0.0696 1.0000    
          
Govt 0.0808 0.0766 0.1220 0.0892 -0.3232* 0.1511 1.0000   
          
pop_growth 0.0728 -0.1221 -0.1729 0.1132 0.5371* 0.0833 -0.3080* 1.0000  
          
urbanpop 0.2224* -0.0862 0.0559 -0.1507 -0.2065* 0.2735* 0.3166* -0.3418* 1.0000 
Notes:  ** and * indicate significance at 5% and 10%, respectively 
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3.2      Methodology 
3.2.1 Quantile Regression 
In order to estimate the long run relationship between unemployment and inflation 
targeting as well as to explore whether the effect of inflation targeting depends on the level of 
unemployment, quantile regression estimation method is utilised. The major reason for using 
quantile regression is that it allows us to examine whether the relationship between unemployment 
and inflation targeting depends on the dependent variable itself (unemployment). This technique 
follows seminal works of Koeker and Bassett (1970s). Quantile regression model can be specified 
as:  
Qy(q|X)=β0(q)X0+ C1(q)X1+ β2(q)X2+...+ βn(q)Xn +ui                                  (1) 
where Qy is dependent variable in qth quantile, (q) means that the parameters are for a particular q 
quantile (q є [0, 1), X represents all explanatory variables and β captures the marginal effects of 
explanatory variables in each quantile. In general the conditional linear quantile can be written as: 
Qq(Yi|Xi)= X'iβi                                                                                                     (2) 
The qth quantile estimator of 𝛽𝑞 minimises the objective function given as: 
𝑄(𝛽𝑞) = ∑ 𝑞 𝑁𝑖=𝑦≥𝑋𝑖′𝛽 �𝑦𝑖 − 𝑋𝑖′𝛽𝑞� + ∑ (1 − 𝑞 )𝑁𝑖=𝑦≤𝑋𝑖′𝛽 �𝑦𝑖 − 𝑋𝑖′𝛽𝑞�                              (3) 
where 0<q<1, and we use βq instead of β to make clear different choices of q to estimate various 
values of β. For instance, if q=.75, then more weight is placed on estimation of values greater than 
𝑦 ≥ 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽 than for observations with 𝑦 ≤ 𝑋𝑖′𝛽. 
There are many other reasons why quantile regression is preferred. Firstly, quantile 
regression is robust even in the presence of heterogeneity (Cade &Noon, 2003). Terrell et.al, 1996, 
argue that use of regression quantile in linear model with unequal variance helps us to detect the 
relationship between and among variables that might have been deemed statistically insignificant 
based on the estimates of means. In addition, unlike OLS which is sensitive to outliers and 
becomes inefficient when the dependent variable has highly non-normal distribution, quantile 
regression is more robust (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Quantile regression also helps us to 
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picture a wider characterisation of data by allowing us to study the impact of the covariate on the 
full distribution or a particular quantile, and not just the conditional mean. Finally, quantile 
regression does not require the assumption of zero conditional mean which is the major 
assumption for consistency in OLS.  
 
3.2. 2 Interaction Methodology 
To investigate whether the impact of inflation targeting on unemployment depends on the level of 
financial development, two equations are estimated following interaction approach. Regression 
models can be summarised2 as: 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖 = 𝑎0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖 + 𝐵3𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖 +𝜃′𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖           (4) 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖 = 𝑎0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖 + 𝐵3𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖 +
𝜃′𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖      (5) 
 
Where Uni=unemployment for country i, it_sharei=share for inflation targeting for country i 
weighted depending on the time of adoption of inflation targeting, findevi=indicator for financial 
development (m2) for country i, it*findev=captures interaction effects between inflation targeting 
and financial development, controli=all control variables included in the model, where 
β1=coefficient for it_share, β2=coefficient for financial development, β3=coefficient for 
interaction term, θ'=coefficient for all explanatory variables, εit=error term 
The equation 4 estimates the impact of inflation targeting on unemployment using 
contemporaneous values, where we assume that there is no reverse causality between the 
dependent variable and the independent variable. However, being mindful that financial 
                                                          
2 Definition of Variables used in this paper (see Appendix 1) 
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development and other independent variables may be endogenous, hence this paper follows 
Levine R. (1997) where initial values of independent variables are used instead of 
contemporaneous values, thus we specify equation 5. By utilising initial values we are able to 
remedy any spurious relationship between unemployment and inflation targeting that may be 
influenced by reverse causality. By regressing unemployment on initial values of the regressors, 
we assume that the current unemployment cannot influence initial values of the regressors; 
however initial values can influence the current average unemployment, thereby dealing with the 
problem of reverse causality. If the actual time period in which the improvement in financial 
development lowers or increases unemployment is shorter than our sample period, then initial 
values are expected to reduce the bias arising from reverse causality.  
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4.0 Results 
 
 
4.1 Estimation results for unemployment and inflation targeting impact 
4.1.1 Results for Contemporaneous Model 
This section reports estimation results for the impact of inflation targeting on 
unemployment. We begin by reporting quantile estimation results for contemporaneous model 
while results for initial regression model are presented in the latter section. Table 3 presents results 
for the relationship between inflation targeting and unemployment, without including control 
variables. Column 1 shows OLS results while column 2 to column 6 display results for 10th 
quantile, 25th quantile, 50th quantile, 75th quantile and 90th quantile, respectively. 
Table 3: Contemporaneous quantile results without controls 
   Quantile regression estimates 
  OLS q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
unemp  (1) (2) (3 ) (4) (5) (6) 
it_share  -0.377 0.634 2.352 -1.138 -4.574* -2.147 
  (1.566) (2.352) (2.012) (2.187) (2.523) (6.291) 
_cons  8.316*** 3.207*** 4.106*** 8.335*** 12.420*** 14.553*** 
  (0.760) (0.622) (0.872) (1.097) (1.334) (0.817) 
N  0.00 60 60 60 60 60 
R2  60 0.0064 0.0309 0.0034 0.0640 0.0209 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%  
and 10%, respectively 
In column 1, OLS results show negative but insignificant relationship between inflation 
targeting and unemployment. From 10th quantile to 20th quantile (column 2 to 3), inflation 
targeting enters positively but the relationship is statistically insignificant. While from 50th 
quantile to 90th quantile, inflation targeting enters negatively and is marginally statistically 
significant in 75th quantile only.  
Table 4 presents quantile results for the unemployment-inflation targeting relationship, 
controlling for financial development. Column 1 shows OLS results, column 2 to column 6 reports 
results for 10th quantile, 25th quantile, 50th quantile, 75th quantile and 90th quantile, respectively. 
 
 
 15 
 
Table 4: Contemporaneous quantile results with financial development as a control variable 
  OLS Quantile regression estimates 
   q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
unemp  (1) (2) (3 ) (4) (5)  
it_share  0.457 2.763 1.050 0.300 -4.009 -1.605 
  (1.511) (2.799) (1.287) (1.773) (2.398) (5.190) 
m2  -0.017*** -0.001 -0.024* -0.014 -0.013 -0.018 
  (0.006) (0.033) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) 
_cons  9.478*** 2.536 7.532*** 8.763*** 13.025*** 14.958*** 
  (0.831) (2.832) (1.893) (1.570) (1.700) (1.631) 
N  0.11 60 60 60 60 60 
R2  60 0.0221 0.1094 0.0623 0.1225 0.0645 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%  
and 10%, respectively 
After including financial development as a control variable, OLS estimated results indicate 
that inflation targeting becomes positive but still remains insignificant. Quantile results show that 
inflation targeting still enters positively and remains statistically insignificant in 10th and 25th 
quantiles, while becomes negatively correlated with unemployment in 75th quantile and 90th 
quantile but the relationship is statistically insignificant. 
Table 5 reports quantile results for the unemployment-inflation targeting relationship with 
more control variables. Column 1 shows OLS results while column 2 to column 6 display results 
for 10th quantile, 25th quantile, 50th quantile, 75th quantile and 90th quantile, respectively. 
Table 5: Contemporaneous quantile results with more controls 
   Quantile regression estimates 
  OLS q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
unemp  (1) (2) (3 ) (4) (5) (6) 
it_share  -0.807 2.162 0.830 -0.715 -3.775* -6.524* 
  (1.454) (1.536) (1.573) (2.448) (2.018) (3.649) 
m2  -0.014** -0.003 -0.019 -0.008 -0.011 -0.013 
  (0.006) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.021) 
inflation  0.004*** 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  (0.000) (0.012) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
rgdprate  -0.516* -0.170 -0.419 -0.738 -0.193 0.528 
  (0.265) (0.417) (0.384) (0.460) (0.584) (0.675) 
govt  -0.000 -0.005 0.008 -0.144 0.131* 0.382 
  (0.114) (0.127) (0.162) (0.153) (0.221) 0.253 
_cons  10.768*** 3.446 7.742* 13.326*** 10.464* 6.559 
  (2.444) (3.421) (4.317) (3.699) (4.294) (4.821) 
N  0.36 59 59 59 59 59 
R2  59 0.1117 0.204 0.184 0.276 0.314 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%  
and 10%, respectively 
Despite including more explanatory variables, OLS results (column 1) indicate that the 
impact of inflation targeting on unemployment remains statistically insignificant. With more 
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controls, quantile results show that inflation targeting has positive but statistically insignificant 
impact on unemployment (quantile 10 and quantile 25). While at a higher level of unemployment 
(quantile 50 to quantile 90), inflation targeting becomes negative and is marginally statistically 
significant from 75th quantile and upwards. 
Finally, we report quantile estimation results with all control variables in Table 6. Column 
1 shows estimation results for OLS, while columns 2 to 6 display estimation results for quantile 
regression. Column 2, 3, 4 and 6 report results for 10th quantile, 25th quantile, 50th quantile, 75th 
quantile and 90th quantile, respectively. 
Table 6: Main results for unemployment and inflation targeting impacts for contemporaneous 
model 
 OLS Quantile regression estimates 
  q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
unemp (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
it_share -0.872 -1.33 0.766 -1.878 -3.832* -6.362** 
 (1.599) (2.43) (1.991) (2.574) (2.205) (2.801) 
m2 -0.012* -0.015 -0.016 -0.010 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.030) 
inflation 0.004*** 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) 
rgdprate -0.234 -0.221 -0.181 -0.677 -0.303 0.548 
 (0.403) (0.2937) (0.365) (0.589) (1.022) (0.872) 
trade -0.007 0.006 0.003 -0.010 -0.022 -0.029 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.023) (0.015) (0.032) 
govt 0.022 0.063 0.044 -0.149 0.057 0.268 
 (0.113) (0.160) (0.210) (0.262) (0.159) (0.218) 
pop_growth -0.831 -1.307* -1.190 -1.087 -0.315 -1.327 
 (0.612) (0.734) (0.754) (1.100) (1.318) (1.212) 
urbanpop -0.019 -0.017 -0.006 0.002 -0.022 -0.040 
 (0.038) (0.046) (0.058) (0.095) (0.055) (0.064) 
_cons 11.951*** 7.175 6.945 15.485*** 15.109*** 14.167** 
 (3.021) (4.285) (4.182) (4.591) (4.306) (5.549) 
N 59 59 59 59 59 59 
R2 0.40 0.2130 0.2490 0.2210 0.2933 0.3968 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%  
and 10%, respectively 
In Table 6 (column 1) OLS regression results show that inflation targeting has negative 
and statistically insignificant impact on unemployment. Financial development (m2) is negatively 
correlated with unemployment and statistically significant at 10 percent level. All other control 
variables in column 1 are insignificant except inflation which is significant at 1 percent level but 
displaying unexpected sign.  
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In 10th quantile (column 2), inflation targeting enters negatively and is statistically 
insignificant. All other explanatory variables are statistically insignificant except population 
growth rate which is statistically significant at 10 percent level and is negatively correlated with 
unemployment. In 25th quantile (column 3), coefficient for inflation targeting is positive but 
statistically insignificant. All other variables in column 2 are also insignificant. In 50th quantile 
(column 4), the impact of inflation targeting remains statistically insignificant and enters 
negatively as in 10th quantile. Estimation results for all other control variables remain insignificant. 
In 75th quantile (column 5), inflation targeting remains negative and becomes statistically 
significant at 10 percent level. This implies that adoption of inflation targeting in countries with 
higher unemployment would decrease unemployment. All other control variables are insignificant. 
In 90th quantile (column 6) coefficient for inflation targeting remains negative and statically 
significant at 5 percent level, while all other variables remain insignificant.  
OLS results for contemporaneous model (Table 3- 6) reveal that inflation targeting has no 
significant impact on unemployment. However, quantile regression results show that, at lower 
levels of unemployment, inflation targeting has positive and insignificant impact on 
unemployment. While at higher level of unemployment, inflation targeting has negative impact on 
unemployment. Coefficient of determination (R2) is large enough in all columns, implying that 
variations in unemployment are largely explained by the variations in the independent variables. 
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Figure 1 below depicts quantile regression results presented in Table 6 (column 2 to 6). 
Figures 1a to 1h show coefficient for each contemporaneous independent variable and indicates 
whether a particular regressor is statistically significant in a particular quantile or not. It is evident 
that inflation targeting is significant from 75th quantile to 90th quantile as depicted by Figure 1a; 
and this is in line with results in table 3. 
Figure 1: Coefficient for each regressor in contemporaneous model 
 
 
4.1.2 Results for Initial Model 
We now report initial regression results on impact of inflation targeting on unemployment. 
Table 7 presents results for the relationship between inflation targeting and unemployment, 
without including control variables. Column 1 shows OLS results while column 2 to column 6 
represent 10th quantile, 25th quantile, 50th quantile, 75th quantile and 90th quantile, respectively. 
Table 7: initial quantile results without controls 
   Quantile regression estimates 
  OLS q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
unemp  (1) (2) (3 ) (4) (5) (6) 
it_share  -2.366** 3.373*** 2.537 -1.841** -4.727*** -6.990*** 
  (1.073) (1.264) (1.520) (0 .751) (1.384) (0 .874) 
_cons  8.615*** 2.831*** 4.106*** 8.479*** 11.582*** 14.555 
  (0.695) (0 .583) (0 .904) (0 .615) (1.096) (0.732) 
N  0.03 60 60 60 60 60 
R2  60 0.0361 0.0348 0.0419 0.0860 0.1267 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%  
and 10%, respectively 
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Without including controls, OLS results (column 1) show negative and significant 
relationship between inflation targeting and unemployment. Inflation targeting enters positively in 
10th quantile (column 2) and is statistically significant at 1 percent level. In 25th quantile inflation 
remains positive but becomes statistically significant. From 50th quantile to 90th quantile, inflation 
targeting is negative and statistically significant. Without including control variables, inflation 
targeting is significant in all quantiles except in 25th quantile. 
Table 8 shows quantile results for the relationship between unemployment and inflation 
targeting for initial regression model, with only financial development included as a control 
variable. Column 1 shows OLS results, column 2 to 6 reports quantile results representing 10th 
quantile, 25th quantile, 50th quantile, 75th quantile and 90th quantile, respectively. 
Table 8: Initial quantile results including financial development 
   Quantile regression estimates 
  OLS q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
unemp  (1) (2) (3 ) (4) (5) (6) 
it_share  -2.426** 3.058 1.169 -1.907 -4.353*** -7.027*** 
  (1.065) (2.265) (2.038) (1.164) (1.035) (1.089) 
m2  -0.015*** -0.010 -0.015 -0.009 -0.014 -0.019 
  (0.005) (0.009) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) 0.028 
_cons  9.704*** 3.555 6.046*** 9.009*** 12.476*** 15.610*** 
  (0.775) (1.302) (1.771) (0.937) (1.393) (1.576) 
N  0.12 60 60 60 60 60 
R2  60 0.0535 0.0763 0.0825 0.1396 0.1592 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%  
and 10%, respectively 
OLS results in column 1, inflation targeting still enters negatively and is significant at 5 
percent level. While quantile results show that inflation targeting is positively correlated with 
unemployment from 10th quantile (column 1) to 25th quantile and is statistically insignificant. 
From 50th quantile to 90th quantile, inflation targeting enters negatively and statistically significant, 
with exception of 50th quantile where inflation targeting is statistically insignificant.  
Table 9 shows results for the unemployment-inflation targeting relationship, with more 
control variables included. OLS results are displayed in column 1. Column 2 to column 6 show 
results for 10th quantile, 25th quantile, 50th quantile, 75th quantile and 90th quantile, respectively. 
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Table 9: Initial quantile regression results with more controls 
   Quantile regression estimates 
  OLS q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
unemp  (1) (2) (3 ) (4) (5) (6) 
it_share  -2.108* 2.402 0.206 -1.312 -3.425** -6.253** 
  (1.135) (2.812) (1.574) (1.612) (1.510) (2.610) 
m2  -0.021*** -0.008 -0.0153 -0.016 -0.0168 -0.017 
  (0.005) (0.023) (0.011) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) 
inflation  0.002*** 0.002 0.003 0.003 .002 .001 
  (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (.003) (0.003) 
rgdprate  -0.130 -0.115 (-0.207) -0.151 -0.053 0.071 
  (0.078) (0.158) 0.172 (0.162) (0.138) (0.208) 
govt  0.010 0.0267 0.026 -0.011 -0.022 0.053 
  (0.041) (0.102) (0.118) (0.111) (0.092) (0.095) 
_cons  9.719*** 3.744** 6.344** 9.389*** 12.445*** 14.179*** 
  (1.019) (1.394) (2.479) (2.292) (1.831) (1.471) 
N  0.21 60 60 60 60 60 
R2  60 0.0921 0.1533 0.1475 0.2052 0.2248 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%  
and 10%, respectively 
After including more controls, OLS results (column 1) show that inflation targeting 
remains negatively correlated with unemployment but becomes marginally statistically significant. 
Quantile results show that inflation targeting has positive but statistically insignificant impact on 
unemployment, at lower levels of unemployment (quantile 10 and quantile 25). While at a higher 
level of unemployment (quantile 50 to quantile 90), inflation targeting becomes negative and is 
statistically significant in 75th quantile and 90th quantile.  
Finally, we include all explanatory variables in the initial model, results are shown in 
Table 10. Column 1 displays OLS results, column 2 to 6 show estimation results for quantile 
regression. Column 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 represent results for 10th quantile, 25th quantile, 50th quantile, 
75th quantile and 90th quantile, respectively. 
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Table 10: Main results for unemployment and inflation targeting impacts for initial regression 
model 
  OLS Quantile regression estimates 
   q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
unemp  (1) (2) (3 ) (4) (5) (6) 
it_share  0.920 1.000 1.167 -0.546 -3.428** -4.128** 
  (1.374) (3.412) (2.846) (1.111) (1.307) (1.781) 
m2  -0.023*** -0.0224 -0.022 -0.017** -0.016 -0.033*** 
  (0.005) (0.0181) (0.016) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) 
inflation  0.003*** 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 
  (0.000) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
rgdprate  -0.201** 0.0363 -0.156* -0.180* -0.024 -0.263 
  (0.080) 0.118 (0.078) (0.099) (0.187) (0.225) 
trade  0.022 -0.0283 0.016 0.011 0.013 0.062* 
  (0.015) (0.025) (0.016) (0.013) (0.035) (0.037) 
govt  -0.030 0.101 -0.021 -0.122 -0.024 0.021 
  (0.078) (0.141) (0.108) (0.112) (0.173) (0.223) 
pop_growth  0.635 0.360 0.905 0.689 -0.173 0.905 
  (0.536) (0.588) (0.784) (0.724) (0.816) (1.240) 
urbanpop  0.044 0.047 0.080** 0.067*** 0.019 0.030 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.023) (0.045) (0.044) 
_cons  4.895** 1.938 0.196 5.222** 10.086** 8.207 
  (2.273) (2.550) (3.109) (2.563) (4.109) (6.250) 
N  60 60 60 60 60 60 
R2  0.34 0.1687 0.2467 0.2640 0.2697 0.3781 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%  
and 10%, respectively 
In Table 10 above (column 1), OLS regression results show that inflation targeting is 
positively correlated with unemployment but the relationship is statistically insignificant, implying 
that inflation targeting has no impact on unemployment. Unlike in contemporaneous model, 
financial development (m2) is strongly correlated with unemployment, as it now becomes 
significant at 1 percent level and also coefficient for financial development remains negative. 
Inflation and GDP growth rate are significant at 1 percent level and 5 percent level respectively; 
however the sign for inflation is unexpected. All other control variables for OLS estimation results 
in column 1 remain insignificant. 
In 10th quantile (column 2), inflation targeting enters positively and is statistically 
insignificant. All other explanatory variables are statistically insignificant. In column 3, coefficient 
for inflation targeting is positive and statistically insignificant, consistent with contemporaneous 
results in Table 6. GDP growth rate and urban population growth rate are statistically significant at 
10 percent level and 5 percent level, respectively and display expected signs. All other variables in 
 22 
 
column 2 are also insignificant. In 50th quantile (column 4) the impact of inflation targeting 
remains statistically insignificant and enters negatively. Coefficient estimates for financial 
development, GDP growth rate and urban population growth rate are negative and statistically 
significant at 5 percent level, 10 percent level and 1 percent level, correspondingly. However, 
results for other control variables are insignificant. In 75th quantile (column 5), inflation targeting 
remains negative and becomes statistically significant at 5 percent level, meanwhile all other 
control variables are insignificant. In 90th quantile (column 6) coefficient for inflation targeting 
remains negative and statically significant at 5 percent level. While financial development and 
trade are significant at 1 percent level and 10 percent level, respectively.  
According to OLS results, inflation targeting becomes statistically insignificant after 
controlling for more relevant variables. Table 10 (column 1) provides more reliable OLS results as 
all necessary explanatory variables are taken into account, and shows that inflation targeting does 
not have significant impact on unemployment. Quantile estimation results (from Table 7-10) 
reveal that the impact of inflation targeting on unemployment depends on the level of 
unemployment. After controlling for the possibility of reverse causality, results for initial quantile 
regression model indicate that, at lower levels of unemployment, inflation targeting does not have 
significant impact on unemployment. However, at higher level of unemployment, from 75th 
quantile to 90th quantile, inflation targeting has negative and significant impact on unemployment. 
Results in column 5 and 6 are not only statistically significant but also economically significant as 
indicated by the magnitude of the coefficient estimates. Turning to statistical significance pattern 
of control variables, some variables become significant when they are estimated in different 
quantiles, implying that their impact at mean or median point of unemployment may not be 
significant but become significant either below (lower quantile) the mean or above (higher 
quantile) the mean. From column 1 to 6, R2 is large enough implying that our model is good and 
has power to explain that variations in unemployment are due to variations in changes in 
explanatory variables. 
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The Figure 2 below displays quantile regression results in Table 10 (column 2 to 6). The 
Figure 1a to 1h shows whether coefficient for each contemporaneous independent variable is 
statistically significant in a particular quantile or not. For instance, it is clear from Figure 2a that 
inflation targeting becomes statistically significant at higher levels of unemployment (75th quantile 
to 90th quantile). 
Figure 2: Coefficients for each regressor in initial regression model 
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4.2 Estimation results for inflation targeting impact and financial development 
4.2.1 Results for Contemporaneous Regression Model 
Table 11 reports OLS estimated results for contemporaneous model in column 1 to 4. 
Column 1 shows the impact of inflation targeting on unemployment without controlling for level 
of financial development, column 2 controls for financial development and includes interaction 
term, column 3 includes more variables and interaction term, and finally column 4 includes all 
variables and interaction term. 
Table 11: Main results for inflation targeting and financial development impacts for 
contemporaneous regression model  
unemp (1) (2) (3) (4) 
it_share -0.377 -6.386** -7.439*** -7.882*** 
 (1.566) (2.440) (2.234) (2.309) 
m2  -0.055*** -0.052*** -0.049*** 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
it_m2  0.088*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 
  (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) 
inflation   0.004*** 0.004*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
rgdprate   -0.411* -0.059 
   (0.224) (0.322) 
govt   0.024 0.033 
   (0.109) (0.101) 
trade    -0.010 
    (0.007) 
pop_growth    -0.926 
    (0.590) 
urbanpop    -0.004 
    (0.034) 
_cons 8.316*** 12.152*** 12.607*** 13.176*** 
 (0.760) (1.046) (2.187) (2.780) 
R2 0.00 0.21 0.46 0.50 
N 60 60 59 59 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%  
and 10%, respectively 
Without controlling for other factors, inflation targeting in column 1 enters negatively but 
the relationship is statistically insignificant. While in column 2 when financial development and 
interaction term are included, inflation targeting remains negatively correlated with unemployment 
but the relationship now becomes statistically significant. Financial development is also negative 
and significant, while the interaction term enters positively and is statistically significant. In 
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column 4 when more variables are included, inflation targeting still enters negatively and becomes 
highly significant at 1 percent level. Meanwhile inflation targeting coefficient has improved in 
absolute terms when more variables are included. Financial development remains negative and 
significant in column 3, and coefficient for interaction term also remains positively correlated with 
unemployment and significant. Inflation and GDP growth rate results are also significant while 
government expenditure is statistically insignificant. After including all control variables, inflation 
targeting is still significant at 1 percent level and remains negative in column 4, however, the 
coefficient for inflation targeting further improves. Financial development and the interaction term 
remain highly significant in column 4. Inflation rate is also statistically significant, however with 
unexpected sign. All other control variables are not significant in column 4.  
 
4.2.2 Results for Initial Regression Model 
However, being mindful that results in contemporaneous model may be driven by 
endogeneity problem (reverse causality), now we turn to results from the initial regression model. 
Table 12 reports OLS estimated results for initial regression model. Column 1 shows the impact of 
inflation targeting on unemployment without controlling for level of financial development, 
column 2 controls for financial development and includes interaction term, column 3 includes 
more variables and interaction term, and finally column 4 includes all variables and interaction 
term. 
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Table 12: Main results for inflation targeting and financial development impacts for initial 
regression model 
Unemp (1) (2) (3) (4) 
it_share -2.366** -11.731*** -11.180*** -9.472** 
 (1.073) (3.890) (3.553) (4.000) 
m2  -0.029*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
it_m2  0.143*** 0.139*** 0.119** 
  (0.052) (0.047) (0.053) 
inflation   0.002*** 0.003*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
rgdprate   -0.105 -0.161** 
   (0.084) (0.078) 
govt   0.039 -0.008 
   (0.074) (0.076) 
trade    0.021 
    (0.014) 
pop_growth    0.482 
    (0.538) 
urbanpop    0.037 
    (0.030) 
_cons 8.615*** 10.552*** 10.028*** 6.347** 
 (0.695) (0.840) (1.534) (2.378) 
R2 0.03 0.18 0.26 0.39 
N 60 60 60 60 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%  
and 10%, respectively 
Inflation targeting in column 1 enters negatively and is significant. In column 2, after 
controlling for financial development and the interaction effects, inflation targeting remains 
negatively correlated with unemployment and becomes highly statistically significant. Inflation 
targeting coefficient improves substantially after including level financial development and the 
interaction term. Financial development also enters negatively and is statistically significant. The 
interaction term is positive and highly significant. In column 3, inflation targeting enters 
negatively and is significant, while the inflation targeting coefficient drops after including more 
variables. Financial development and the interaction term are still significant. Inflation is 
significant and displays unexpected sign3, while all other variables are insignificant. Turning to 
column 6, after accounting for all control variables, inflation targeting is still negative and remains 
significant. Coefficient for interaction term is statistically significant and positive, implying that 
                                                          
3 Coefficient estimates for inflation display unexpected sign contrary to our economic a prior. Economic theory 
assumes negative relationship between inflation and unemployment, contrary to the findings of this paper; this could 
be due to problems in our data. 
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adoption of inflation targeting where the level of financial development is higher would 
exacerbate unemployment levels. GDP growth rate enters negatively and is statistically significant, 
meaning that increase in GDP reduces unemployment. 
Our findings are robust to use of different estimation techniques, different models as well 
as use of different controls. The results show that inflation targeting has nonlinear effects on 
unemployment. In countries with higher unemployment rates, adoption of inflation targeting 
reduces unemployment. However, while inflation targeting reduces unemployment, this beneficial 
effect is watered-down by improvement in financial development.  
In particular, quantile regression results reveal that inflation targeting has no impact at 
lower levels of unemployment, while becomes negative at higher levels of unemployment. While 
results for interaction methodology, show that the impact of inflation targeting on unemployment 
becomes highly significant and negative, after controlling for the level of financial development. 
However, the interaction effects of inflation targeting and unemployment is significant and 
positive, consequently moderating the beneficial impact of inflation targeting on unemployment. 
The intuition from positive coefficient for the interaction effect of financial development and 
inflation targeting could partly imply that the more the financial sector is developed the more 
likely it would be associated with reduced financial risks (exchange risk, default risks) as a result 
interest rates are lower and this lowers savings leading to decline in funds available for investment 
and hence lower job creation. In addition, countries that are financially developed are also more 
developed and are more likely to have lower inflation hence lower prices, and this in turn reduces 
incentives for production thereby increasing unemployment.  
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5.0 Conclusion 
 
 
This paper investigated the nonlinearity in the impact of inflation targeting on 
unemployment. In particular, the paper examined whether the impact of inflation targeting on 
unemployment depends on the level of unemployment itself and also whether the level of financial 
development matters in determining unemployment-inflation targeting relationship. This study 
uses cross-sectional data averaged over the period of 1990 to 2010 obtained from 68 inflation 
targeting and non-inflation targeting countries. The results show that inflation targeting has 
nonlinear effects on unemployment. In countries with higher unemployment rates, adoption of 
inflation targeting reduces unemployment. However, while inflation targeting reduces 
unemployment, this beneficial effect is moderated by financial deepening. 
The findings of this study are in tandem with the prediction of this paper that inflation 
targeting should be associated with lower unemployment in less developed countries as it lowers 
macroeconomic uncertainty hence more incentives to invest leading to more job creation. In 
addition, these results also support the findings of prior studies such as Yeh and Huang (2014) that 
find no significant impact of inflation targeting on unemployment in a panel of 74 countries. Yeh 
and Huang (2014), however, after segregating those countries to developing and developed, they 
find that adoption of inflation targeting is associated with higher (lower) unemployment in 
developed (developing) countries. 
It is clear from our findings that countries with high levels of unemployment are more 
likely to gain from adopting inflation targeting than those with lower unemployment, therefore it 
would be important for high unemployment countries to consider adopting inflation targeting as a 
monetary policy framework. However, apart from other necessary preconditions for implementing 
inflation targeting being met, monetary authorities and government also need to consider the level 
of financial development in order to gauge the likely impacts on unemployment of monetary 
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policy shift to inflation targeting. This is because the level of financial development also affects 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy since for monetary policy to work there is a need 
to exist significant relationship between the monetary policy and financial sector. The findings 
also reflect that adoption of inflation targeting is beneficial to countries with lower level of 
financial development. This is because those countries are more likely to have more unstable 
inflation, less investment and higher unemployment as a result adoption of inflation targeting 
improves economic certainty and confidence thereby leading to higher investment and more job 
creation. 
Given this study takes into account cross country heterogeneity and long run relationship 
between unemployment and inflation targeting; however it does not give us the complete picture 
of cross country heterogeneity. Therefore, future studies may consider utilising panel 
heterogeneity co-integration methodology in order to capture the whole picture of cross country 
heterogeneity as panel heterogeneity co-integration methodology takes into account cross country 
commonalities and differences arising from large movements of macroeconomic aggregates across 
countries due to ever increasing globalisation. 
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1: Definition of Variables 
 
 
Variable Name Definition 
Unemployment Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but 
available for and seeking employment (% of total labor force) 
it_share Equals greater than 0 or equal to 1 when a country adopted inflation 
targeting, 0 otherwise 
Financial 
development (M2) 
Represents liquid liabilities measured as money supply plus quasi money as a 
percentage of GDP 
GDP growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant 
local currency (annual %)). Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. 
dollars. 
Government General government final consumption expenditure measured as a percentage 
of GDP 
Trade Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a 
percentage share of gross domestic product. 
Population growth Annual population growth rate for year t is the exponential rate of growth of 
midyear population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage. 
Urban population Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national 
statistical offices, % of total population. It is calculated using World Bank 
population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World 
Urbanization Prospects. 
Inflation Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual 
percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket 
of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, 
such as yearly (annual %)). The Laspeyres formula is generally used. 
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Appendix 2: List of countries 
Country List 
1 Argentina 44 New Zealand 
2 Australia 45 Nigeria 
3 Austria 46 Norway 
4 Bangladesh 47 Peru 
5 Belgium 48 Philippines 
6 Botswana 49 Poland 
7 Bulgaria 50 Romania 
8 Canada 51 Russia 
9 Chile 52 Saudi Arabia 
10 China 53 Serbia 
11 Colombia 54 Singapore 
12 Croatia 55 Slovak Republic 
13 Cyprus 56 Slovenia 
14 Czech Republic 57 South Africa 
15 Denmark 58 Spain 
16 Ecuador 59 Sweden 
17 Estonia 60 Switzerland 
18 Finland 61 Syria 
19 France 62 Thailand 
20 Germany 63 Tunisia 
21 Ghana 64 Turkey 
22 Greece 65 United Kingdom 
23 Guatemala 66 United States 
24 Honduras 67 Venezuela, RB 
25 Hungary 68 Vietnam 
26 Iceland   
27 India   
28 Indonesia   
29 Ireland   
30 Israel   
31 Italy   
32 Japan   
33 Kenya   
34 Korea   
35 Kuwait   
36 Latvia   
37 Lithuania   
38 Luxembourg   
39 Malawi   
40 Malaysia   
41 Malta   
42 Mexico   
43 Mozambique   
 
